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Abstract 
With the continued projection of increases in air 
traffic density, operations in the National Airspace 
System (NAS) are expected to exceed human 
capabilities in the near future [1]. In order to address 
the bottleneck of human workload capacity, highly 
automated safety-critical systems are under 
development to support air traffic controllers. 
However, the transfer of tasks and capabilities from a 
human agent to an automated agent is not without its 
pitfalls. Human controllers provide safe, efficient, 
and creative problem-solving in conflict situations- 
situations that often are outside the abilities of an 
automated system. In order for controllers to best use 
their creative problem-solving skills in safety-critical 
situations, automated agents must shoulder ‘routine’ 
activities contributing to controller workload in the 
current-day system, such as housekeeping tasks and 
basic separation assurance activities.  
The detection and resolution of conflicts 
required for basic separation assurance is the primary 
contributor to current day workload, since it requires 
controllers have an awareness of all aircraft to 
produce effective solutions. However in high-traffic 
airspace (e.g., 30+ aircraft in a sector), full situation 
awareness becomes impossible without automated 
assistance. While research on the automation of 
conflict detection and resolution is fairly well 
established, questions remain concerning the give and 
take between the responsibilities of the human 
controller and those of the automated agent.  
Discussed here is a portion of a larger human-in-
the-loop experiment examining controllers’ transition 
through four hypothetical automation stages of the 
Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen). This portion, called Maximum NextGen, 
simulated a fully automated environment where the 
automation was responsible for detecting and 
resolving conflicts within simulation parameters in 
high-density airspace. The human moved to primarily 
a supervisory position: typically only assuming 
control over separation assurance tasks during 
conflict situations deferred by the automation. While 
tasks were allocated a-priori between the controller 
and automated agent, controllers maintained 
authority to inhibit the automation from interacting 
with particular aircraft. This analysis focuses on the 
circumstances surrounding controller’s inhibitory 
actions upon the automation, postulating about their 
reasons for doing so based on contextual similarities, 
ultimately identifying preliminary trends for both 
further research and automation refinement.    
Introduction 
A key component in accommodating the 
expected increase in air traffic in the next 50 years is 
the allocation of work in the air traffic management 
system. While very safe, the current system for 
managing the NAS is constrained by the cognitive 
capacity of human air traffic controllers [1]. While 
human controllers remain valuable and necessary to 
the system for their flexible and creative decision-
making, NextGen incorporates a number of agents, 
establishing a partnership between human air traffic 
controllers and assistive automation with decision-
making capabilities [1]. While many of these 
automated agents are partially or fully developed, 
some debate remains about the appropriate allocation 
of functions between agents (human and automated) 
in NextGen.  
A subset of this over-arching question focuses 
on what Miller and Parasuraman [2] explain as the 
difference between adaptive and adaptable 
automation. Adaptive automation describes an 
automated agent whose system design specifies its 
ability to acquire and execute tasks, and is not 
manipulable in real-time by other agents in the 
system. For example, automation in an air traffic 
management system may automatically acquire 
control over hand-off tasks when the number of 
aircraft in a controller’s sector exceeds fifteen. These 
boundaries are inflexible and are a feature of the 
system. Miller and Parasuraman [2], while citing the 
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value in this design principle, argue for the use of 
adaptable automation.  
In adaptable automation the human agent uses 
their discretion in delegating tasks to or regaining 
tasks from the automation based on a predefined set 
of capabilities. For example, an air traffic controller 
may be notified they are controlling more aircraft 
than the recommended limits with the suggestion 
they allow the automation to take over hand-off tasks. 
In adaptive automation, the automated agent would 
seize control over handoffs, in adaptable automation, 
the automation can only request control, with the 
ultimate authority in the hands of the human agent. In 
adaptable automation, the automated agent may have 
default control over a number of tasks, like hand-offs, 
which the human agent can then inhibit, re-allocating 
control over the task to themselves, then allow the 
automation to regain control of the task later.  
While both adaptive and adaptable designs have 
their merits, there is no hard and fast rule on which is 
most appropriate for each unique system. Certainly 
there are indicators and issues concerning 
responsibility and liability, workload, and situation 
awareness, as well as the consideration of the human 
agents within a system who may not wish to have 
tasks involuntarily ceded from their control. Which 
design is best for the safe and efficient management 
of the NAS is still under debate. 
Adaptable Automation for Maximum NextGen 
To better understand human-automation issues 
in the air traffic management environment, the 
Airspace Operations Laboratory (AOL) at NASA 
Ames Research Center examined elements of 
adaptable automation within the context of a larger 
experiment. The full experiment dealt with varying 
levels of automation assistance and intervention in 
the air traffic management system, from minimal 
automation in current-day operations, to a maximum 
NextGen condition where the majority of separation 
assurance tasks were the responsibility of the 
automated agent and not the human controller. The 
Maximum NextGen condition was the only 
opportunity to examine a feature of adaptable 
automation, as this was the only condition where the 
controller had the ability to inhibit the automated 
agent’s actions upon aircraft. For information on the 
other conditions, the following publications discuss 
the experiment in detail: [3-8]. 
The purpose of this publication is to explore the 
conditions under which a human controller inhibited 
automated action upon an aircraft. The analysis 
encompassed data from five controllers who each 
acted to some extent independently. For this reason, 
conclusions are preliminary and are an interpretation 
of a rare and multi-purpose event. 
Methods 
Airspace 
The test airspace (Figure 1) included five 
adjoining, high-altitude, en-route sectors of the 
Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center 
(ARTCC, ZOB). These sectors were divided into two 
areas of specialization (denoted by color in Figure 1), 
located in physically separate rooms. While the floor 
of each sector was set at 33,000 feet, each had a 
unique shape and traffic pattern. 
 
Figure 1. Test Airspace Based on the Cleveland 
ARTCC 
Traffic  
Live recordings of Cleveland traffic for the test 
sectors provided the basis for the simulated traffic. 
Traffic increased from the current day condition to 
the Maximum NextGen condition, where traffic was 
100% over the current day baseline capacity for those 
sectors, with a Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) value 
of 36 aircraft per sector. Traffic included a mixture of 
overflights and departures / arrivals from local 
airports. In the Maximum NextGen condition, all 
aircraft were able to receive Data Comm messages 
for frequency changes and control instructions. 
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Apparatus & Display 
Operations were emulated using the java-based 
platform MACS (Multi Aircraft Control System) 
developed in the AOL [9]. Voice communications 
enabled live communications between participants 
with a VIOP system. Controller workstations were an 
emulation of the Display System Replacement 
(DSR), and consisted of the same monitor, keyboard 
and trackball used in operational facilities. As seen in 
Figure 2, aircraft were displayed as grey chevrons 
with a limited data block by default. The limited data 
block expanded to a full data block automatically in 
response to an automation detected conflict. 
Controllers could also manually expand the limited 
data block. 
 
Figure 2. Display Screenshot of the Default 
Chevrons with a Collapsed Data Block and a 
Chevron with a Conflict Flagged 
Participants 
Two controllers worked each of the five test 
sectors: a radar controller (R-side) and an on-demand 
radar associate controller (D-side). Confederate or 
“ghost” controllers managed the surrounding 
airspace, while two controllers worked supervisory 
positions. The R-sides and supervisors served as test 
positions, staffed by six current and one recently 
retired front line manager from US ARTCCs. This 
analysis only includes data from the five test 
participants working R-side positions. 
Maximum NextGen Roles and Responsibilities 
All aircraft were Flight Management System 
(FMS) equipped for this condition, and could receive 
Data-Comm messages both directly from the 
controller and from the ground automation agent. 
Similar to the automation, the majority of controller 
resolutions were issued via Data-Comm directly to 
the flight-deck; however, controllers retained verbal 
communication with their aircraft. 
Automation 
Based, in part, on the Automated Airspace 
Concept introduced by Erzberger [10], the ground 
automation was responsible for the safe separation of 
traffic, all conflict detection, and resolution, and 
automatically sending all necessary control 
instructions to aircraft via Data-Comm. Additionally, 
the automation was responsible for alerting the 
controller to any exceptional circumstances. The 
automation’s tools solved conflicts and provided 
resolutions similar to a human controller. However, 
the automation’s resolution authority for strategic 
conflicts (i.e., mid-term time horizon) included 
specific tolerance parameters. If the automation’s 
resolution exceeded the tolerance parameters, the 
automation flagged the conflict for the controller. For 
tactical conflicts (i.e., near-term time horizon), the 
automation calculated a heading change to be issued 
to one or both aircraft for separation [10].  
Controller 
While controllers retained authority over all the 
aircraft in their sector, their role shifted to primarily a 
supervisory capacity, managing any exceptions 
beyond the automation’s parameters. However, while 
they shared responsibility with the automation for 
losses of separation (LOS), they were not liable for a 
LOS if the conflict was not detected, not alerted to 
the controller, and / or not issued a separation 
assurance heading by the automation for tactical 
conflicts. When controllers needed to resolve a 
conflict themselves, they had interactive tools 
containing the same information the automation used 
for its resolutions, allowing them to interactively find 
solutions. In addition to interactive tools, controllers 
could inhibit the automation from up-linking any 
messages to multiple aircraft until they rescinded the 
inhibition. 
Conflict Resolution Tools 
Both the automation and controllers had access 
to a conflict resolution tool. The automation’s auto-
resolver solved conflicts with resolutions not 
imposing less than: 90 seconds of delay, 60 degrees 
of heading change, 2200 feet of altitude change, and / 
or 50 knots of speed change. If a conflict was not 
  1C3-4 
solvable within those constraints, the automation 
flagged the conflict for the controller, expanding the 
conflicting aircraft’s data blocks and listing the 
conflict in the conflict list (Figure 3). The controller’s 
tools included a trial-planner with integrated conflict-
probe feedback that allowed them to test various 
maneuvers before sending clearances to an aircraft. 
Similarly, an altitude fly-out menu incorporated 
feedback from the conflict-probe, helping the 
controllers to evaluate potential maneuvers. 
Controllers then uplinked their resolutions to the 
flight deck via Data-Comm. 
TSAFE 
The Tactical Separation Assured Flight 
Environment (TSAFE) algorithm stepped in to 
resolve conflicts with less than two minutes until 
LOS [10], issuing a lateral route amendment 
designed for immediate, short-term separation 
assurance. Prior to the uplink, TSAFE displayed the 
calculated heading change to the controller on the 
fifth line of the data block at three minutes until LOS 
(Figure 4). TSAFE was an automatic function; it 
always triggered unless the controller blocked the 
automation from interacting with an aircraft using the 
inhibition function. If the clearance was uplinked by 
the automation, a follow-up clearance was also sent 
to return the aircraft to its route. 
 
 
Figure 3. Interactive Conflict Resolution Tools Available during the Maximum NextGen Condition 
 
Inhibition  
Available to the controllers was the ability to 
inhibit the automation from sending any messages to 
aircraft. This inhibition function, invoked by entering 
an ‘NU’ keyboard command, inhibited the 
automation from sending anything to an aircraft 
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(including routine tasks such as frequency changes). 
This inhibition remained in place until the controller 
removed it, using an ‘AU’ keyboard command. The 
NU function did not prevent the automation from 
showing the controller the TSAFE route amendments 
it would be issuing if not inhibited. For example, in 
Figure 4, both aircraft are inhibited [the pink box], 
but the automation still displays the TSAFE 
resolution for the controller’s reference. 
 
Figure 4. Inhibited Conflicting Aircraft 
Displaying a TSAFE Resolution 
Procedures  
As with all the study’s conditions, the Maximum 
NextGen condition consisted of two days in the 
laboratory: one day of training, followed by one day 
of data collection. The data collection consisted of six 
40-minute runs of traffic with breaks in between and 
a lunch period half-way through.  
Collected data consisted of various performance 
and subjective measures. MACS logged controller 
and pilot actions, flight path, aircraft states, losses of 
separation, time, and other metrics as well as a real 
time workload rating by participants. Camtasia 
recording software recorded all audio transmissions 
and screen recordings. Post-trial questionnaires 
collected subjective data.  
Results 
Whether or not the controllers inhibited the 
automation varied greatly by sector. Because of this, 
a traditional analysis was not available. Instead, 
controllers were grouped based on their use of the 
inhibition function. Each group was then examined as 
a case study, noting any trends. More specifically, 
frequencies counted the number of conflicts whose 
resolution included an inhibition event. A conflict is 
an automation predicted loss of separation (LOS) 
between two or more aircraft. This analysis did not 
count the inhibitions themselves, since conflicts may 
have resulted in inhibition of one or both aircraft – 
whichever the controller preferred. Table 1 counts the 
number of times a conflict led to an inhibition action 
by the controller on one or both aircraft. 
Table 1. Frequency of Conflict Resulting in 
Inhibition Events 
 
As shown in Table 1, two controllers inhibited 
the automation more frequently than the other three. 
The three who did not (sector 26, 49, and 59) are 
examined first; this analysis is limited to general 
observations about the circumstances surrounding the 
conflicts leading to the inhibitions. However, 
analyses of sectors 38 and 79 compare conflict 
situations that led to an inhibition, alongside conflict 
situations resolved without inhibiting the automation. 
This latter set of analyses characterize conflict 
situations across multiple parameters, as measured at 
the time of the last recorded active conflict state, 
intended to represent the moment just before an 
inhibition of the automation, or just before a 
controller issued a maneuver. The “sectors 38 and 
79” section below reports those results.   
Sectors 26, 49, and 59 
As seen in Table 1, the controllers in sectors 26, 
49, and 59 only inhibited the automation on a few 
occasions- 11 in total. As this was a new function for 
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the controllers, its rare use is understandable. 
Experimenters prompted the use of the inhibition 
function for four of these eleven conflict solutions. 
Specifically, during three conflicts for sector 49, and 
during one conflict for sector 59, the controller 
inhibited the automation based on suggestions from 
the experimenters. All four of these conflicts were 
tactical in nature, with less than three minutes to 
initial loss of separation, and in all cases, TSAFE 
would have issued a turn to one or both of the 
aircraft. Commentary available from the video 
recordings suggests that a priority of these controllers 
was to limit lateral maneuvers for these aircraft. For 
example, Sector 59 in run 22 said in regards to an 
inhibition, “I'm trying it [Inhibition] right now 
because I don't want it to turn that guy whose 
climbing out there 10 minutes away…” and sector 49 
said in regards to an inhibition for a conflict 
involving two sets of aircraft, “It would have been a 
lot of turns.” 
In the same vein of turn limitation, in all but one 
of the seven conflicts leading to inhibitions 
independent of experimenter suggestion, the 
controller either issued an altitude or waited a 
conflict out. In the cases where the controller waited, 
their behavior indicated they had identified a false 
alert by the automation. These false alerts are 
categorized as conflicts where, if nothing is changed, 
they fail to achieve a loss of separation [10]. None of 
the conflicts controllers inhibited and then waited out 
resulted in a LOS, indicating the controllers could 
correctly identify these situations.  
Sector 49 especially preferred to wait out a 
conflict situation. For example, in Figure 5, sector 49 
sees a conflict between COA7081 and TCF9959, 
promptly inhibits the automation from sending 
messages to either aircraft, sees the TSAFE 
resolution, and waits until the conflict disappears 
without issuing any changes to either aircraft. In this 
particular case, the controller apparently had 
confidence the climbing aircraft would safely ascend 
past the conflicting altitude. Concurrently, sector 49 
was dealing with a different conflict in the sector that 
required more controller involvement. 
 
 
Figure 5. Step by Step process for Waiting Out a Conflict Using an Inhibition
Sectors 38 & 79 
Of the five sectors, sectors 38 and 79 had the 
highest number of predicted conflicts leading to 
inhibitions by the controllers, 21 and 19, respectively, 
with only three prompted by suggestions from the 
experimenters. All the conflicts for sectors 38 and 79 
contain two parameters of interest: time until 
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predicted LOS and the predicted vertical states of the 
conflicting aircraft. These parameters may lead to 
insights regarding whether or not the controller 
would trust the automation to ensure separation when 
a LOS was imminent, and / or they may speak to 
controller’s reaction to TSAFE advisories.   
Conflicts with and without inhibitions were not 
paired observations, requiring an examination of 
trends instead of statistical inference. Figure 6 
contains the distributions for time until loss of 
separations for conflicts with and without inhibitions, 
as well as a cumulative percentage line for each 
histogram. This line indicates the percentage of the 
overall data set reached by that point. Figure 6 shows 
the cumulative percentage line is much steeper in 
conflicts with inhibitions until six minutes than in 
conflicts without inhibitions, indicating a greater 
percentage of the data in conflicts with inhibitions 
lies in six minutes or less than in conflicts without 
inhibitions. 
Time to Predicted Initial LOS 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of conflicts with 
and without inhibitions across time to initial LOS. 
Both the overall distribution and the general time 
horizons (near, mid, far) are of interest. Near-term 
conflicts ranged from 0:00-3:00 minutes to LOS, 
mid-term conflicts ranged from 03.01-06:59 minutes 
to LOS, and far-term conflicts were 07:00+ minutes 
to LOS.  
 
Figure 6. Minutes Until Predicted Initial Loss of 
Separation 
Comparing the cumulative percentage line of 
both distributions identifies a trend where conflicts 
leading to inhibitions are more likely to be in the near 
and mid-term time frames (<06:59) than conflicts 
without inhibitions. Specifically, at the six minute 
bin, the cumulative percentage for conflicts with 
inhibitions is 65.85%, while for conflicts without 
inhibitions, it’s 41.77%. 
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That the majority of conflicts with inhibitions 
occur in near-term and midterm time horizons 
suggests these controllers may be motivated to 
intervene and inhibit the automation for conflicts 
with less time until loss of separation. Of the 40 total 
conflicts with inhibitions, 20 fell into the mid-term 
time horizon group, nine near-terms had a TSAFE 
advisory posted (02:01 min-03:00 min) and three 
near terms triggered a TSAFE resolution (<02:00 
min). Only eight fell into the far-term time horizon. 
 
 
Figure 7. Predicted Vertical State for Conflicts with and without Inhibitions 
 
Predicted Vertical Profile of the Conflict at Initial 
LOS 
A conflict’s vertical profile describes the 
predicted vertical states of the involved aircraft: 
level, climbing, or descending. An analysis of the 
data grouped the climbing and descending states into 
a single ‘transitioning’ state, in order to examine the 
likelihood that inhibitions occurred in more complex 
encounters. As seen in Figure 7, both sectors 38 and 
79 inhibited Level/Transition conflicts the majority 
of the time, with the rest of the inhibitions for 
Level/Level conflict probes. Of note is that no 
inhibitions occurred on the few Transition/Transition 
conflict probes. Of the Level/Level conflicts with 
inhibitions, nine of 11 [82%] were solved by an 
altitude, and of the Level/Transition conflict probes, 
17 of 29 [59%] were solved by waiting it out, with 
eight of 29 [28%] by altitudes. Six of those eight 
altitudes and two of three headings were for near-
term conflict probes, making an altitude or heading 
change predominantly a near-term solution for 
Level/Transition conflict probes. 
Proactive Inhibitions 
Like sectors 26, 49, and 59, there was also a 
trend in sectors 38 and 79 of proactive inhibitions- 
inhibitions the controller executed before TSAFE 
could display an advisory, or as part of a larger 
strategy beyond just the current conflict. These 
proactive inhibitions seem to have resulted from a 
desire to avoid multiple changes to aircraft, 
especially heading changes. Of the conflicts with 
inhibitions, 35 of 40 automation inhibitions resulted 
in either the controller issuing an altitude change 
[S38=8 of 21, S79=8 of 19] or waiting the conflict 
out (identifying a false alert) [S38=10 of 21, S79=9 
of 19]. The circumstances around dealing with a false 
alert varied; controllers used inhibition to suppress 
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actions by the automation on false alerts, or to allow 
changes and / or plans by the controller time to take 
effect. For example, in Sector 79 the controller 
identified a false alert and inhibited a climbing 
aircraft with a conflict, saying “I better NU him 
before it (the automation) does something” and 
waited the conflict out. This behavior was especially 
notable for conflicts involving Level / Transition 
vertical states, which composed all but two of the 
waiting strategies related to false alerts. 
Differently, Sector 38 had a conflict probe 
appear and then issued an amendment, which cleared 
the conflict for the time being. The conflict re-
occurred a few seconds later, at which point the 
controller inhibited the automation, saying: “Pretty 
sure that's the guy I just fixed, so now I better go and 
NU these guys before they do something different.” In 
this case, the pilot hadn’t yet completed executing the 
controller’s amendment, causing the conflict probe to 
re-alert. The inhibition suppressed the automation to 
allow the controller’s change time to take effect. 
Boredom 
The controllers for sectors 38 and 79 each at one 
time verbally expressed having ‘nothing else to do’ 
as the reason for their inhibition of the automation. 
Controller 79 in run 21 said, "Since I'm not doing 
anything, let me NU those" and controller 38 in run 
24 said, "Oh, got something to do!" at the appearance 
of a conflict which 38 then proceeded to inhibit. Both 
of these conflicts had more than three minutes 
remaining until the predicted LOS. 
Discussion 
The primary question of this exploration was 
why the controllers chose to inhibit the automation. 
Because each controller exhibited unique behaviors 
to some extent, and inhibition occurrences were few 
when compared to the overall number of conflict 
probes, more research is still needed in order to fully 
understand how, in more automated environments, 
controllers could incorporate automation-inhibition 
strategies into their overall work flow. However, this 
data did preliminarily reveal that:  A) inhibition 
behavior more often happens when there is less time 
until loss of separation, B) conflicts with 
Level/Transition vertical profiles are more often 
inhibited, and C) participants primarily applied the 
inhibitions to conflicts they identified as false alerts, 
and when it wasn’t a false alert they preferred 
altitudes over headings as resolutions. 
Inhibiting conflicts with less time until loss of 
separations leads to several possible considerations. 
First, controllers were identifying false alerts 
primarily in the mid-term time frame, which suggests 
the conflicts need to be closer to loss of separation to 
make this identification possible. Secondly, the 
controllers may have issues trusting the automation to 
resolve conflicts when there is not enough time left 
for a backup plan before the loss of separation. 
Thirdly, they may wish to avoid the lateral headings 
issued by the TSAFE algorithm at the two minute 
mark. A combination of motivations addressing the 
automation’s false alerts and lack of time for a 
backup plan seem most likely since most (70%) of 
the inhibitions occurred before TSAFE posted the 
advisory at the three minute mark.  
The controllers’ penchant for identifying and 
inhibiting false alerts could be rooted in their desire 
to avoid lateral headings (turns) in this highly 
congested airspace. Level/Transition conflicts made 
up the majority of conflicts with inhibitions in this 
data set and were the most often identified as false 
alerts. The controllers rarely took any action on these 
Level/Transition conflicts, however, when they did 
issue an amendment, it was more likely to be an 
altitude change than a lateral maneuver.   
Repetitive behavior on the part of the controllers 
such as this allows for an opportunity to refine the 
automation’s behavior. When an aircraft is inhibited, 
the controller must delegate attention to monitor that 
aircraft, something the automation would normally 
handle. By refining the automation to identify and 
adjust false alerts so no inhibitory action is required 
by the controller, this workload on the human agent 
in the system can be alleviated.  
The proactive use of the inhibition function was 
an additional insight not necessarily related to a 
potential conflict’s characteristics. There was a trend, 
especially for sectors 38 and 79, of using the 
inhibition to manipulate the automation long before a 
conflict became a near term concern. This long range 
planning shows the use of inhibition as part of the 
controller’s overall strategy for interacting with their 
traffic and the automation, as well as managing their 
workload and situation awareness.  
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Conclusion 
The ability to inhibit the automation, thereby 
adapting the allocation of functions in real-time, 
allowed the controllers to customize their traffic 
management, workload, and situation awareness 
strategies. Some controllers did see the value of using 
the inhibition to re-engage in their sector 
management when they were bored or not doing 
something else; a concern when dealing with a highly 
automated environment. While this experiment 
condition only collected data for one day, it is 
reasonable to expect a higher occurrence of these 
engagement issues with longer exposure to such 
operations.  
The actions on behalf of the controllers to inhibit 
the automation in this experiment lend to the idea that 
such interactions are a valuable tool for proactive 
planning, attention management and overall sector 
management strategy; giving credence to the 
adaptable automation scheme. However, the 
noticeable differences between the groups of 
controllers- those who frequently incorporated it and 
those who infrequently incorporated it- suggests that 
the proper use of inhibitions needs training like any 
other tool. Since adaptable automation only changes 
task function allocation at the controller’s discretion, 
neglect on the part of the controller to take advantage 
of the feature may nullify its value, while an over use 
of the inhibition will increase their workload and 
potentially compromise safety. In either case, 
controllers properly equipped with knowledge on 
when and how to use an inhibition function will be 
more able to manage their traffic, workload and 
situation awareness effectively.  
While interesting trends did surface, the data 
examined in this analysis was only from a handful of 
events drawn from a larger simulation, warranting 
further investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding inhibitions. Further studies should 
evaluate the automation’s conflict thresholds, 
particularly for vertical trajectory segments, in an 
effort to reduce such false alerts. Additionally, a 
closer look at a larger sample of controllers’ 
propensity to make use of the inhibition feature 
would be valuable, as well as more information on 
how conflict parameters and airspace characteristics 
affect inhibition behavior.  
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